Abstract-Despite a variety of theoretical-sound techniques have been proposed to generate cancellable biometric templates, there is rarely practical solution that satisfies non-invertibility, revocability, non-linkability and performance simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a locality sensitive hashing inspired cancellable biometrics framework, namely "Index-of-Max" (IoM) hashing. Briefly, IoM hashing non-linearly transforms a realvalued feature vector into discrete index hashed code. We demonstrate two realizations from IoM hashing framework, namely Gaussian Random Projection based and Uniformly Random Permutation based hashing schemes. The discrete indices representation nature of IoM hashed codes enjoy several merits such as it empowers strong concealment to biometric information. This contributes to the solid ground of noninvertibility guarantee. IoM hashing is insensitive to the magnitude of features, hence are more robust against biometric features variation and its magnitude-independence trait makes the resultant hash codes scale-invariant, which is critical for matching and feature alignment. The experimental results demonstrate reasonable accuracy performance on benchmark FVC2002 and FVC2004 fingerprint databases. Moreover, the analyses justify its resilience to the existing and newly introduced security and privacy attacks as well as satisfy the revocability and unlinkability criteria of cancellable biometrics. Besides, the implementation of IoM hashing is also incredibly simple for practical applications.
reported to protect the biometric templates. Generally, the proposals available in literature can be broadly divided into two categories: feature transformation (or cancellable biometrics) and biometric cryptosystems (biometric encryption). Biometric cryptosystem serves the purpose of either securing the cryptographic key using biometric feature (key binding) or directly generating the cryptographic key from biometric feature (key generation). On the other hand, cancellable biometrics [1] is truly meant for biometric template protection. It refers to the irreversible transform methods that can alter the biometric templates such that security and privacy of the templates can be assured. If a cancellable template is compromised, a new template can be re-generated from the same biometrics. The cancellable biometric schemes in literature vary according to different biometric modalities.
Fingerprint is probably the most widely used biometric trait and the fingerprint minutiae is deemed as a reliable and stable local feature for accurate verification and identification [2] . It was believed that reconstructing a fingerprint image from its minutiae set is infeasible. However, such hypothesis has been overthrown after Hill demonstrated the first template inversion scheme [3] . Since Hill's attempt, a number of efficient methods, e.g. [4] have been proposed to reconstruct the fingerprint image from minutiae efficiently. Accordingly, it is no longer secure to store the original minutiae as a template. Yet, it is indeed quite challenging to design a protection scheme with the following criteria [5] .  Non-invertibility or Irreversibility: It should be computationally infeasible to derive the original biometric template from a single instance or multiple instances of protected templates with or without auxiliary data (helper data). This property prevents the privacy attacks such as inversion attack and Attack via Record Multiplicity (ARM).  Revocability or Renewability: A new instance of protected template can be revoked or re-issued when the old template is compromised.  Non-linkability or Unlinkability: It should be computationally difficult to differentiate two or more instances of the protected templates derived from the same biometric trait. It prevents the cross-matching across different applications, thus, preserves the privacy of individual.  Performance preservation. The accuracy performance of the protected templates should be preserved with respect to the before-transformed counterparts. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, literature works is reviewed in Section II. In Section III, the motivations and contributions of the paper are highlighted. In Section IV, the relevant background knowledge is given. The IoM hashing is described in Section V. Next, the experimental results are given in Section VI, supported by the performance analysis. In Section VII, security, privacy and revocability analysis are drawn. Finally, conclusion is given in Section VIII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the past decades, numerous template protection schemes have been proposed. Several decent and comprehensive review papers exist in this topic such as [5] [6] . We direct the readers to explore the details from these review papers.
In this paper, we focus on review 1) several state-of-the-arts fingerprint minutia-based cancellable template schemes since fingerprint modality is the subject of study in this paper; 2) a number of generic template protection schemes. By generic, we refer to template protection schemes that applicable to other biometric modalities such as face and iris as IoM hashing is indeed a kind of generic template protection scheme.
A. Minutiae-based Fingerprint Cancellable Template
Yang & Busch [7] proposed a fingerprint template protection method based on minutia vicinity. Given N minutiae {mi |i=1,…,N}, each minutia mi with the three nearest neighboring minutiae {ci1,ci2 and ci3} together form a set of minutia vicinity Vi ={mi, ci1,ci2,ci3|i=1,…,N}. Each minutia vicinity comprises of 12 orientation vectors: mi→ci1, ci2→ci3, ci3→ci1, etc. The four coordinate pairs of Vi are then transformed based on the 5 (out of 12) randomly selected orientation vectors in the respective minutia vicinity. Next, the random offsets are added to each Vi in order to conceal the local topological relationship among the minutiae in the vicinity. The transformed minutiae are thus regarded as a protected minutia vicinity with stored random offsets.
However, Simoens et al. [8] pointed out that the coordinates and orientations of minutiae in Yang & Busch [7] could be revealed if both random offsets and orientation vectors are disclosed to an adversary. They also showed that the attack complexity is considerably low (e.g., only 2 17 attempts are required when the random offsets table is known with reference to 2 120 attempts when the random offsets table is not known). Although Yang et al. [9] later proposed a dynamic random projection which was originally outlined in Teoh et al. [10] to alleviate this problem, dynamic random projection incurs substantially increased computation cost than that of random offsets used in [7] .
Ferrara et al. [11] demonstrated a recovery algorithm to reveal the original minutiae from the minutia cylinder-code (MCC) descriptor, a state-of-the-art fingerprint descriptor proposed by Cappelli et al. [12] . A non-invertible scheme for MCC is hence proposed, namely protected minutia cylindercode (P-MCC). P-MCC computes the mean vector ̅ and k largest eigenvectors Φ from the MCC descriptor during training. These parameters are used for Binary-KL projection, which can be viewed as a one-bit binarization process of the projected features. Nevertheless, the cancellability is not addressed in P-MCC. A two-factor protection scheme on P-MCC, namely 2P-MCC [13] is hence put forward to make the P-MCC be cancellable. Yet, the specific design of MCC and its variations for point set data limit the propagation to other popular biometric modalities like face and iris.
Multi-line Code (MLC) proposed by Wong et al. [14] is a minutia descriptor constructed based on the spatial distribution of the neighboring minutiae within a fixed radius. Firstly, a straight line is drawn following the direction of the reference minutiae and constructs a number of overlapped circles with a pre-defined radius. Then the neighbor minutiae are separated into different bins according to their orientation. Compute the mean of the distances between the center of the circle and the included minutiae for each region. In the binarization stage, two techniques of binarzation method are used, 1-bit and kbits binarization. 1-bit binarzation is implemented based on a threshold while gray code is used in k-bits implementation. If MLC is compromised, the adversary can only obtain the rotated version of minutia vector. The regions reconstructed from different minutia vectors are uncorrelated as the orientations of the reference minutiae are independent to each other. Thus, MLC may reduce the effort of brute force attack but difficult to recover the minutiae set.
Wang and Hu [15] proposed a blind system identification approach to protect biometric template. This is motivated by fact that source signal cannot be recovered if the identifiability is dissatisfied in blind system identification. This new approach exhibits decent accuracy performance preservation and the irreversibility of transformed template is justified theoretically and experimentally. However, the protected template against other major attacks (e.g. ARM) is unknown.
B. Generic Template Protection Techniques
A well-known instance of generic biometric template protection method, namely Biohashing [16] , is based on userspecific random projection, where a user-specific orthonormal random matrix ∈ ℝ × where ≤ is generated from the auxiliary data (also known as helper data). The extracted feature vector ∈ ℝ is then projected via y=R T x, and ∈ y is binarized based on a chosen threshold value τ such as: = 0, if 1 < , and = 1 otherwise, for i= 1,…, q. In the event of template is compromised, a new template can be generated by issuing a new set of random vectors from user-specific token. Biohashing works in various biometric modalities such as fingerprint minutia [9] , fingerprint texture [16] , face [10] , iris [17] etc. However, the non-invertibility of Biohashing could be jeopardized if both Y and R are revealed. This is because Biohash is essentially a quantized under-determined linear equation system, which could be solved partially via pseudo-inverse operation [10] .
Recently, another generic template protection technique, namely Bloom filter has been introduced. Bloom filter demonstrates a well adaptation to the popular biometric modalities such as iris [18] , face [19] and fingerprint [20] . Bloom filter is first applied in IrisCode [17] and is descripted as follows: a Bloom filter is a bit vector of length . The Bloom filter is initialized with zeros and formed by adding elements '1' into it using independent hash function {ℎ ∊ [0, − 1]| = 1, … }. Practically, instead of using independent hash functions, a binary-to-decimal mapping is proposed. The IrisCode with dimension × is first splited into blocks with size = , where is the number of columns of each block. Each block , ∊ [1, ] constitutes the formation of the bloom filter . This can be done by adding element '1' to based on the position that manifested by each column codeword ∊ {1,0} inside , where ∊ [1, ] and 1 ≤ ≤ . Same will be mapped to the same element in the bloom filter resulted a many-to-one mapping hence non-invertibility criterion is satisfied. To achieve cancellability, an application-specific secret key is applied, just like other cancellable biometric schemes do.
However, despite the decent performance preservation, the security and privacy of Bloom filter based schemes remains unresolved. For instance, Hermans et al. [21] demonstrates a simple and effective attack scheme that matches two protected templates derived from a same IrisCode using different secret bit vectors, thus break the requirement of non-linkability. Moreover, a security analysis also reveals that the false positive or key recovery can be accomplished with a low attack complexity of 2 25 and 2 2 to 2 8 attempts respectively [21] . Bringer et al. [22] further analyzed the non-linkability of the protected templates generated from two different IrisCode of the same subject. They revealed when the key space is too small, a brute force attack would be succeeded while the accuracy performance declines if the key size is increased. Experiment confirms the vulnerability of irreversibility with block width of 16 or 32 in Bloom filter scheme.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
From the reviewed methods in literature, we can observe the limitations of cancellable biometrics that motivates us to design the IoM hashing as follows:  Some of the afore-discussed "non-invertible transforms" are in fact susceptible to partial or full inversion (e.g., [ [16] .  Some of the afore-discussed methods are weak to survive from the security and privacy attacks, e.g. ARM [15] , false-accept attack (dictionary attack) [11] .  State-of-the-art fingerprint minutiae protection scheme (e.g. P-MCC [12] , 2P-MCC [13] ) limits the coverage to certain biometric feature/modality, i.e. point set data.  Trade-off between performance and non-invertibility. This is due to the contradiction where non-invertibility always requires zero information leakage, which implies total losing of information, whereas accuracy performance preservation is only possible when discriminative information of original template can be preserved [5] .  Accuracy performance discrepancy. Some of the twofactor cancellable biometric approaches that utilize userspecific token such as BioHashing [16] would suffer from the accuracy performance discrepancy problem under genuine-token and stolen-token scenarios [1] . It is often observed that genuine-token scenario yields a large performance gain over stolen-token scenario, which imposes an unrealistic assumption where the token is to be secretly kept all the time. Therefore, any template protection scheme that requires independent auxiliary data to achieve revocability/cancellability should be free from this issue [5] .
With above justifications, we outline a generic cancellable biometric framework dubbed Index-of-Max (IoM) hashing. IoM hashing is motivated from Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) in data clustering and nearest neighbour search domain. As a special instance of LSH family, IoM hashing enjoys the merits of strong theoretical and empirical guarantee of accuracy preservation after hashing. With its pure discrete indices representation nature that non-linearly transformed from the real-valued biometric features, IoM hashing can strongly protect the biometric data from being inverted. In this paper, we demonstrate IoM hashing by means of fixed length fingerprint vector that derived from fingerprint minutiae [23] .
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We devise a novel LSH inspired IoM hashing framework as a means of cancellable biometric construct. It strongly conceals the biometric features while satisfies the performance accuracy, revocability and renewability. 2) We put forward two realizations of IoM hashing, namely, i.e. Gaussian Random Permutation (GRP)-based and Uniform Random Projection (URP)-based hashing schemes and justify their characteristics both qualitatively and quantitatively. The two realizations are also shown free from the accuracy performance discrepancy problem. 3) We rigorously analyse the security and privacy threads of IoM hashing in both qualitative and quantitative manners. The specific instances include non-invertibility and nonlinkability analysis. Moreover, the existing major privacy and security attacks e.g. invertibility attack, brute force attack, false accept attack, ARM attacks against IoM hashing are particularly highlighted. 4) We introduce a new sophisticated attack for cancellable biometric schemes, namely birthday attack, which is more vulnerable than the false accept attack.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief account for Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH), in which our IoM hashing based. Besides that, we also present the "Winner Takes All" (WTA) hashing [24] and "Random MaxOut Features" (RMF) [25] which have inspired us in devising the URP-based and GRPbased IoM hashing. WTA hashing was meant for data retrieval while RMF is for data classification. The latter is indeed spinoff from Maxout Network in deep learning.
A. Locality Sensitive Hashing
Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) is primarily used to reduce the dimensionality of high-dimensional data by hashing the input items so that similar items map to the same "buckets" with high probability where the number of buckets being much smaller than the input items. The chief objective of LSH is to maximize the probability of a "collision" for similar items. Formally, the LSH family H is defined as follows Definition 1 [26] : A LSH is a probability distribution on a family H of hash functions h such that ℙ ℎ∈ℋ [ℎ( ) = ℎ( )] = ( , ). With a similarity function define on the collection of object X and Y.
The key ingredient of LSH is the hashing of object collection X and Y by means of multiple hash functions ℎ . The use of ℎ enables decent approximation of the pair-wise distance of X and Y in terms of collision probability. LSH ensures that X and Y with high similarity renders higher probability of collision in the hashed domain; on the contrary, the data points far apart each other result a lower probability of hash collision.
Given that 2 > 1 , while , ∈ , and = {ℎ:
→ }, where U is the hashed metric space depends to similarity function defined by S, refers to the number of hash functions ℎ.
B. "Winner-Takes-All" Hashing
The basic idea of WTA hashing [24] is to compute the ordinal embedding of an input data based on the partial order statistics. More specifically, WTA is a non-linear transformation based on the implicit order rather than the absolute/numeric values of the input data, and therefore, offers certain degree of resilience to numerical perturbation while giving a good indication of inherent similarity between the compared items [24] . The overall WTA hashing procedure can be summarized into five steps: 1. Perform H random permutations on the input vector with dimension d, ϵ ℝ . 2. Select the first items of the permuted . 3. Choose the largest element within the K items. 4. Record the corresponding index values in bits. 5.
Step 1 -step 4 is repeated m times, yielding in a hash code of length m, which can be compactly represented using m⌈ 2 ⌉ bits.
C. "Random MaxOut Features"
RMF proposed by Mroueh et al. [25] is a simple yet effective non-linear feature mapping that approximates the functions of interest. Let { ∈ ℝ | = 1, … , , = 1, … , } be the iid standard Gaussian random vector drawn from (0, ). For ∈ ℝ , a RMF is defined as
The IoM hashing employs a fixed-length fingerprint vector or mere fingerprint vector hereafter for brevity, as input; thus we first give a brief description on fingerprint vector and then followed by the IoM hashing description and its two realizations, i.e. Gaussian Random Projection (GRP) and Uniformly Random Permutation (URP).
A. Globally ordered and fixed-length fingerprint vector
As outline in paper [23] , the computation of fingerprint vectors, consists of three main steps, i.e. minutiae descriptor extraction, kernel learning-based transformation and feature binarization. Since IoM hashing takes real-valued vector as input, binarization is hence dropped. The procedure of generating fingerprint vectors is given as follows: 1. Minutiae descriptor extraction, : Minutia Cylinder-Code (MCC) [12] is considered. MCC is a state-of-the-art minutiae descriptor meant to capture spatial and directional relation between the reference minutia = { , , } and neighbor minutiae = { , , | = 1, … − 1}, where is the total number of minutiae within a fixedradius R.
} be a set of MCC descriptor training samples and denotes the total number of . A kernel matrix ∈ ℝ × is then computed with the following kernel function, where
3. With K, the projection matrix ̅ ∈ ℝ × , i.e. the eigenvectors of KPCA can be inferred, where denotes the number of desired output dimensions. 4. Let be the MCC descriptor query instance, is first matched with all training samples
can be computed by concatenating matching scores as follows:
5. is then non-linearly transformed with the kernel function defined in eq. (2) yield
6. The fingerprint vector can be generated:
and ̅ ∈ ℝ × . Thus, the length of is .
B. The IoM Hashing
IoM hashing is a means of cancellable biometrics that can be perceived as a special instance of LSH portray in Definition 1. The locality sensitive function ℎ(. ) in our context, refers to the q-dimension random projection in GRP-based realization (section V(C)) and the -order Hadamard product in URPbased IoM hashing (section V(D)), respectively. In general, IoM hashing embeds the biometric features non-linearly onto an ordinal metric space that characterized by the LSH admitted similarity functions S. In this work, two different S are identified for GRP and URP realizations (section V(E)).
While as a LSH instance, the accuracy performance of biometric features can be largely preserved after IoM hashing. The pure discrete indices representation nature of IoM hashed code enjoys several merits as follows: 1. IoM hashing empowers strong concealment to biometric information which is always manifested in terms of feature magnitudes. This contributes to the solid ground of noninvertibility guarantee, which will be discussed in section VII(A). 2. IoM hashing is insensitive to the magnitude of features, and thus are more robust against many types of random noises in real applications. 3. Magnitude-independence of IoM hashing also makes the resultant hash codes scale-invariant, which is critical to compare and align the features from heterogeneous spaces [27] .
C. Gaussian Random Projection (GRP)-based IoM hashing
GRP-based IoM hashing is inspired by the RMF and can be condensed into a two-step procedure as follows. Pseudo-code of GRP-based IoM hashing is given in Algorithm 1: Note that GPR-based IoM hashing differs from the RMF discussed in section IV(C) in such a way that the representation form of the former encodes the indices of the maximum value of ( ), whereas the latter is mere the maximal numeric values of ( ). In a nutshell, GRP embeds the fingerprint vector onto a q-dimension Gaussian random subspace and the index of max-valued projected feature is taken, which is equivalent to a hashed entry, h(·) from LSH viewpoint. This process is repeated with m independent Gaussian random matrices and yield a collection of m IoM indices. Therefore, GRP hashed codes enjoy the Euclidean pairwise distance preservation in the projected subspace ℝ . The LSH admitted distance/similarity function S is determined by the Lemma 1 in section V(E).
Despite GRP-based IoM hashing and Biohashing [16] share a common ground where both adopt random projections, the distinctions of them are more apparent: 1. The theory of GRP-based IoM hashing is based on the LSH that embeds any finite subset in Euclidian space to ( −2 ) dimensions with 1 + distortion within the neighborhoods with at most r points [28] . While Biohashing is stemmed from the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, which embeds any n-points in Euclidian space to ( −2 log ) dimensions with 1 + distortion. Simply speaking, IoM hashing can be perceived as local manifestation of J-L lemma which works well for local distance preservation but not globally preserved as in Biohashing scheme. Besides, accuracy performance of Biohashing could be deteriorated in stolen-token scenario due to simplistic thresholding operation that endures information lost. This issue does not exist in GRP-based IoM hashing as no thresholding is used. 2. Multiple (m to be exact) Gaussian projection matrices (m independent hashing from LSH perspective) are used in GRP-based IoM hashing whereas mere one single random orthogonal projection matrix is used in Biohashing; 3. GRP-based IoM hashed code is a collection of independent index values while Biohashing is a real-valued feature vector; 4. The projection matrix in Biohashing should be kept secret for maximal security and privacy protection; on the contrary projection matrices of GRP-based IoM hashing is not necessary to be private, in which we will further justify in section VII.
D. Uniformly Random Permutation (URP)-based IoM hashing
The key ingredient of URP-based IoM hashing is the uniform random permutation that inherited from WTA hashing and further strengthened by the Hadamard product operation. The overall transformation is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Suppose a feature vector ∈ ℝ and independent hash functions {ℎ ( ) ∈ [1, ]| = 1, … , } where each hash function consists of -order Hadamard product. The URPbased IoM hashed code is thus generated by concatenating the outputs from independent hash functions. The 5-steps procedure of the URP-based IoM hashing is given as follows and its pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 2. 1. Random Permutation: For each ℎ( ), generate a permutation set , which is generated from p independent random uniform permutation seeds. Then, is permuted yield p permuted vectors, {̂ϵℝ | = 1, … , }. Note that window size k has an impact in the distribution of which indices from the fingerprint vector end up in the code. It is easy to observe that for degenerate case such as k = d where d is the dimension of the fingerprint vector, we have global max encoding to the vector in the IoM hashed code, and to another extreme, k=1 follows a uniform distribution. URPbased IoM hashing utilizes a local max encoding that parameterized by the k-size window, 1< k <d. The choice of k indeed leads to different emphasis on pair-wise agreements for indices at the first k entries in the permuted vector. The value of k offers a way to tune for giving higher weight to top entry in the biometric vectors versus the others [24] .
We particularly highlight that -order Hadamard product in URP-based realization is a crucial factor for security and privacy. Due to the k-windowed permutation nature of URP scheme which is finite in principle, the adversary may launch brute force attack, dictionary attack or ARM (section VII(A) and VII(B)) to either gain illegal access to the system or to recover the biometric features. If both IoM hashed codes and permutation seeds are revealed, the attack complexity could be significantly reduced. The -order Hadamard product can largely increases the difficulty of such recovery. We refer the readers to section VII(B)(2) for detail analysis.
E. Matching of IoM Hashed Codes
The IoM hashing essentially follows the LSH that strives to ensure that two fingerprint vectors with high similarity renders higher probability of collision in the hashed domain; on the contrary, the vectors far apart each other result a lower probability of hash collision. Suppose two hashed codes, enrolled = { | = 1, … , } and query = { | = 1, … , and ( , ) represents the probability of collision of two hashed codes i.e. ℙ[ = ] = ( , ) for = 1, … , . The high probability of collision implies high similarity of , and vice-versa. It is important to note that despite both URP and GRP based IoM hashing are in commonly encode the maximum values of the transformed features in indices representation, the respective similarity functions S(·,·) are different. In what follows, we first give a lemma that enables us to establish the GRP-based IoM matcher. Lemma 1 [29] : For , ∈ ℝ be the unit vector ‖ ‖ = ‖ ‖ = 1 at angle . Let = • = cos and 1 , … , be a sequences of iid standard Gaussian random vectors, the probability for and be not separated by 1 , … , is designated as ( , ). The Taylor series of ( , ) is given: 
( , ) = ℙ {arg max
The matching of GRP-based realization hence can be carried out based on (8) , which echoes the probability of collision of two hashed codes. Operationally, matching score is mere a total number of collisions which can be sought by counting the number of '0' (collisions) after the element-wise subtraction of , over m (total entries of the hashed code). In URP-based IoM realization, the (·,·) is a rank correlation measurement. Briefly, rank correlation refers to the measurement of ordinal association. In this context, the measurement of rank correlation (also known as ordinal measure) is based on the relative ordering of values in a given range. It is recognized as a useful measurement for pixel correspondence in stereo matching [30] . Further, rank correlation has been well explored as a similarity measure defined by the degree to which feature dimension rankings agree between two feature vectors [24] . The pairwise-order, is the simplest similarity measure for rank correlation. The exposition of rank correlation and PO are given in [31] , the PO function can be defined as follows
where
The operational PO function can be reformulated as in eq. (9) [24] where is the length of feature vector and k refers to k-size window in URP-based realization
An interpretation of eq. (9) is as follows: the enumeration in which index i can be the max over a k-sized permutated window is given by the number of ways in which one can pick k-1 entries that are smaller than the entry at i and common to both and , in which also indicate the collision probability of a pair of URP-based hashed codes [24] . This also validates the LSH property of URP realization. Operationally, the matching score is mere by counting the number of 0 after the element-wise subtraction of and over m.
F. Cancellable Template Generation
In the event of template compromise, independent hash functions of IoM {ℎ ( )| = 1, … , } can be easily replaced with afresh tokenized random permutation seeds and tokenized Gaussian random matrices for URP and GRP, respectively. The effectiveness of the revocability is experimentally verified in section VII(D). In real world scenario, the random permutation seeds and random matrices are user-specific for revocability. However, stolen token/seed scenario should be focused as it is closely associated to accuracy performance, security and privacy attacks [5] . To evaluate the stolen-token scenario, our experiment is performed with same random token (i.e. random permutation seed or random matrices) for all subjects. The accuracy performance in stolen-token scenario is presented in VI(B).
G. Generic Template Protection
IoM hashing is generic in the sense that it can apply to most of the common biometrics in which their features are in binary form (e.g. iris, palmprint), fixed-length vector form (e.g. face) and variable-size point set/matrix (fingerprint minutiae, speech biometrics, handwritten signature). Real-valued feature is directly applicable to IoM hashing as demonstrated in this paper while a recent binary cancellable iris exposition, namely Index First One hashing (IFO) [32] in fact is a special case of URP-based IoM hashing where the position of the first one in IFO is encoded in place of the position of maximum value in URP-based IoM hashing. Attribute to the internal connection between IoM hashing and LSH, it is anticipated that IoM hashing can be extended to the other common biometric modalities.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we adopt fingerprint vector X with length 299 outline in [23] as input for IoM hashing evaluations. The evaluations are conducted on six public fingerprint datasets, FVC2002 (DB1, DB2, DB3) [33] and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3) [33] . Each dataset consists of 100 users with 8 samples per user. In total, there are 800 (100×8) fingerprint images in each dataset. The performance accuracy of the proposed method is assessed with Equal Error Rate (EER) and the genuine-imposter distributions. Note that since the random permutation/projection is applied, the EERs are calculated by taking an average of EERs repeated for 5 times for the sake to avoid statistical bias 1 . For matching protocol, as described in [23] , 1 st to 3 rd samples of each identity are used as training samples to 1 The MATLAB and Java codes are available upon request. 
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p=2,m=600 p=3,m=600 p=4,m=600 p=5,m=600 generate the fingerprint vector; thus, the rest samples (i.e. 4 th -8 th ) of each identity are used in this experiment. There are 500 (100×5) in total. Within this subset of data, The Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) [33] protocol is applied across the six data sets, which yields 1000 genuine matching scores and 4950 imposter matching scores for each data set.
A. Parameters of IoM hashing 1) Effect of window size k, Hadamard product order p, and number of hashing functions m
In the URP-based IoM, we first investigate the effect of window size k with respect to the performance in terms of EER. In this experiment, k is varied from 50, 80, 100, 128, 156, 200 to 250 by fixing at 600. The identical setting is repeated for = [2, 3, 4, 5] . Fig. 2 shows the curves of "EER (%)-vs-k" on FVC2002 (DB1, DB2) and FVC2004 (DB3). We can observe that: 1) The EER drops gradually when larger k is applied and levels off when k becomes large. This is not surprised that smaller k leads to more low ranks due to the less comparisons involved while larger k indicates more high ranks included. Fig. 2 illustrates that the significance located in either high rank or low rank depends on individual datasets; 2) The smaller p, the lower EER. As indicated in Algorithm 2 (step 3), the Hadamard product, ̅ ( ) = ∏ (̂( )) =1 is essentially element-wise multiplication of p permuted vectors. Such an operation heightens the difficulty against inversion at the expense of introducing distortion in the product code due to the noises involved in one or multiple permuted vectors. Thus, it is expected that the performance drops with larger p. This also demonstrates the common trade-off suffered in the cancellable biometrics, namely performance-security trade-off. Apart from the above, we also examine the relation between the number of independent hashing functions m and EER. Evaluation has been carried out by increasing the m from 5, 10, 50, 100, 300, 500, 800 and 1000 while fixing k=250, and p=2. As expected, a better EER can be attained with respect to the increment of m and level off at large m as illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . Since randomization takes part in the hashing functions, Central limit theorem [34] suggests that the randomly permuted vectors constructed is approximately Gaussian distributed with sufficiently large m. Experimental evidence suggests that with m=200 and k=250, we obtain reasonably good performance accuracy.
2) Effect of the number of Gaussian random matrices m, number of Gaussian random projection vectors .
In the GRP-based IoM, we investigate the effect of the number of Gaussian random matrices m and number of Gaussian random projection vectors with respect to the EER. In this experiment, m is varied from 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300 and is varied from 2, 3, 5, 10, 50, Fig. 3 (a) The curves of "EER (%) vs m-independent hash functions" FVC2002 and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3); (b) The curves of "EER (%) vs m-Gaussian random matrices" FVC2002 and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3). Fig. 4 shows the curves of "EER (%)-vs-q" (curves display m = 150, 200, 250 and 300 only) using the aforementioned parameters setting on FVC2002 and FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3). We can observe: 1. The plays an insignificant effect with respect to the EER. For instance, we earn EER=0.26% and EER=0.24% for = 2 and 250, respectively where m is fixed to 300. This observation suggests that, with an adequate m, can be effectively made small without compromising EER, which greatly benefits the memory/storage cost and computation efficiency of random projection. 2. On the contrary, the number of Gaussian random matrices m is a significant factor with respect to EER. Fig.  3(b) . This observation in fact confirms the theory of LSH, where points nearby are more likely to fall in the same bucket than the points farther away after hashing. The buckets (quantization) notion in LSH is indeed resembles the GRP-based IoM hashing in which the indices of the maximum value of projected vectors can be deemed as a quantization output.
B. Accuracy Performance Evaluation
In this section, the experiments of accuracy performance in stolen-token scenario using the best parameters tuned in the previous section are carried out for FVC2002 and FVC2004. Table I tabulates the accuracy results as well as comparisons with the baseline system and state of the arts. It can be observed that: 1. The accuracy performance of the GRP-based IoM hashing is well preserved with respect to its original fingerprint vector counterpart [23] and MCC [12] regardless in stolentoken and genuine-token cases. This confirms the efficiency of GRP as a locality sensitive function. Further, it can be observed that the accuracy difference between stolen-token and genuine-token cases is insignificant. This suggests a great advantage that the external token may not be a secret anymore; thus, the security and privacy attention on the secret requirement of the external token can be greatly relaxed. The security and privacy analysis is provided in section VII.
2. The proposed GRP-based IoM hashing excels the existing minutiae based fingerprint cancellable templates [13] [15] [35] in terms of accuracy; this is attributed to the superior MCC descriptor and the nice property of performance preservation of fingerprint vector counterpart [23] and locality sensitive function of IoM hashing. 3. The accuracy performance of the URP-based IoM hashing gradually decreases in FVC2002 (DB1 and DB2) and FVC2004 DB1 while remains approximately 3%-5% of deterioration in the rest of testing data sets. Such deterioration is expected as the discriminate features are likely to be permuted out of the k-window. However, the user-specific tokens of each user counteract the loss of discriminate features, thus, the accuracy in genuine-token scenario is comparable to its original vector counterpart [23] and MCC [12] . This suggests that the URP-based IoM hashing demands higher discriminative features in order to preserve accuracy. Nevertheless, the accuracy of URPbased IoM hashing is comparable to the state-of-the-arts 
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, other measurements and analysis beyond accuracy performance of IoM hashing is presented. We divide them into three subgroups: (1) privacy analysis, (2) security analysis and (3) revocability/unlinkability analysis. Privacy analysis refers to the feasibility of a cancellable biometric scheme to withstand any attack to recover the original biometric data. Unlike privacy attack, security attack is meant to gain the illegitimate access, with feasible attack complexity to the biometric system by means of the fake features (preimage) or the elaborated instances that close to the genuine biometric data.
As far as cancellable biometrics is concerned, privacy analysis includes non-invertibility and Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) analysis while security analysis covers brute force analysis, ARM, false-accept analysis and birthday attack analysis.
A. Privacy Analysis 1) Non-invertibility Analysis
Non-invertibility (irreversibility) refers to the computational hardness in restoring the fingerprint vector from the IoM hashed code with and/or without helper data, i.e. permutation seeds and random matrices that correspond to URP and GRP realizations, respectively. Here, we assume the adversary manages to retrieve the hashed codes, tokens and he knows well hashing algorithm as well as the corresponding parameters (e.g. m, k, p, q). For both URP-based and GRPbased IoM that expressed in the discrete indices form, there is no clue for an adversary to guess the fingerprint vector X information (real-value features) directly from the stolen hashed code alone. Besides, knowing the token (e.g. permutation seeds or projection matrices) is also helpless in recovering the fingerprint vector as no direct link exists between token and fingerprint vector. The way for the adversary to attack is only to guess the real-value directly.
In the worst case, assume that the adversary learns the minimum and maximum values of the feature components of X. Let's take FVC2002 DB1 as an example, the minimum and maximum values of the feature components are -0.2504 and 0.2132 respectively. Presume the adversary has to exhaustively attempt from -0.2504, -0.2503, -0.2502 and so on, until the maximum 0.2132. Thus, there are totally 4636 possibilities. In our implementation, the precision is fixed at four decimal digits, the possibility of guessing a single feature component of X requires 4636 attempts (≈ 2 12 ). Thus, the entire 299 feature components require around 2 12×299 = 2 3588 attempts in total. The possibilities to correctly guess a single and entire feature component are presented in Table II . Obviously, such possibilities are computational infeasible.
2) Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) for Privacy
Attacks via record multiplicity (ARM) is a more dreadful instance of privacy attack, which utilizes multiple compromised protected templates with or without knowledge and parameters that associated to the algorithm for original biometric reconstruction [38] . For IoM hashing, ARM is computationally hard to infer the numerical value as the stored templates have been transformed into hashed space that is uncorrelated to the fingerprint feature space. The attack complexity is thus same to the non-invertibility attack presented in Table II . In fact, ARM is also applicable to security attack that will be detailed in section VII(B)(2).
B. Security Attacks Analysis 1) Brute-Force Attack
Brute-force attack is an instance of security attacks. It is also known as pre-image attack or masquerade attack [5] in literature. Next, we quantitatively analyze the required complexity to break the IoM hashing. For URP realization, assume that the optimal parameters for the best performance are set to m=600 and k=128 that we observed from section VI(A). Since the indices of IoM hashed code taking a value between 1 and 128. Hence, the guess complexity for each entry is = 128 = 2 7 and thus 600 entries require 2 4200 attempts that are far beyond to reach by the present computing facility. On the other hand, for GRP realization, suppose m and q be 300 and 64, respectively, the attack complexity for each entry is = 150 > 2 7 , the complexity for 300 entries require 2 2100 attempts that is computational infeasible as well. Furthermore, we empirically verify the above theoretical estimation in sequel. In the experiment, we randomly generate a large number of hashed codes and perform illegitimate access. For each fingerprint vector, 1000 randomly hashed codes are generated and match against the fingerprint vector with identical permutation seeds or projection matrices. This results 500,000 (5×100×1000) matching scores in which we named brute-force attack scores. Then, we plot the imposter and brute-force attack distribution as shown in Fig. 5 . It can be observed that the brute-force attack distribution is either strongly overlapped or offset to the left with respect to the imposter distribution. This indicates that the brute-force attack scores lead to an equivalent dissimilarity with the imposter scores. This experimental result echoes the theoretical estimation above; thus, conclude the infeasibility of bruteforce attack.
2) Attacks via Record Multiplicity (ARM) for Security
Unlike ARM for privacy, ARM is also a plausible security attack where multiple compromised protected templates with or without knowledge and parameters that associated to the algorithm are utilized to yield a pre-image instance and gain illegitimate access. In our case, if knowing the order of the feature components (not necessary the numerical value) and the permutation seeds, an elaborate faked feature vector (preimage) can be formed. Consequently, the largest value resulted from the product of two permuted feature vectors appears in the desired position. The system can thus be broken. Now, the attack complexity of ARM is can be treated as the complexity of determining the order of the feature components in the fingerprint vector. < . This is contradicted with > . Such inequality reasoning is applicable to GRP-based realization as well attributed to the multiplication is the common ingredient for Hadamard product in URP-based realization and the inner product (random projection) in GRPbased realization. Therefore, ARM for IoM hashing is only valid if biometric feature values are either all negative or positive, the mixed sign in values renders inequality reasoning indefinite. We now can conclude that the inequality relation is insufficient to launch ARM for security attack.
3) False Accept Attack
Unlike blind guessing on the entire hashed code in brute force attack, false accept attack (dictionary attack) may requires far less number of attempts to gain illegitimate access [39] . In fact, this attack is viable due to the fact that thresholding-based decision scheme is commonly applied in biometric systems. In other words, access would be granted as long as the matching score succeeds the pre-defined threshold , which can significantly reduce the attack effort. Let we take the best performing parameters from the FVC2002DB1 experiments in section VI(A), i.e. m=600 and k=128, the decision threshold observed at this setting is 0.11. Hence, the minimum number of agreed (collided) entries in IoM hashed codes pair for successful access is mere × = 0.11 × 600 = 66. The window size k indicates 128 possible indices values that is equivalent to 2 7 (= 2 log 2 ) guessing effort is required for an entry. Therefore, the false accept attack complexity can be estimated from (2 log 2 ) × . For URP-based IoM hashing, we observed from Table III that the attack complexity reduced to 2 462 compare to 2 4200 in brute force attack for FVC2002DB1 and the complexity reduction appears identical for the rest of testing data sets. However, we note that the reduced attack complexity is still favorably high to resist false accept attack.
On the other hand, the attack complexity of GRP-based IoM hashing is more critical with carelessly selected parameters as evidenced in Table III . To escalate the attack difficulty, we can increase either m or . Let = 1200 be set for FVC2004 (DB1, DB2 and DB3), the attack complexity thus, reaches a level of computational infeasibility. Another option is to elevate by reducing q as shown in Table III (FVC2002 DB1,  DB2 and DB3 ). This option is preferable than the former i.e. increasing m as it reduces the number of random Gaussian projection vectors. On the contrary, the former option requires larger storage for large m.
4) Birthday Attack
Apart from the above attacks, we present a new security attack for cancellable biometrics, namely Birthday attack [40] . Specifically, a birthday attack exploits the mathematics behind the birthday problem [40] in probability theory. The attack relies on the higher collision likelihood found between the random attacks and a fixed degree of permutations (pigeonholes).
In our context, birthday attack refers to a scenario where an adversary has gained a large number of hashed codes from the compromised databases. This leads to a plausible security attack where at least a collision (match) can be found between any two hashed codes from number hashed codes where >>1. For the hashed code with single entry ( = 1), the expected trials of finding the first collision is ( ) = √ 2 , where is the largest entry value of IoM hashed codes, i.e. = for URP and = for GRP. Suppose there is a collision of two hashed codes i.e. ℎ ( ) = ℎ ( ) where = 1, … , and ℎ( ), ℎ( ) ∈ [1, ] . The expected trials of finding the collisions for elements is hence ( 2 ) 2 . From Table IV , it can be observed that the complexity of birthday attack over the conventional false-accept attack is reduced approximately in square root degree. More importantly, Table IV reminds us that attack difficulty is closely associated to the parameters selected. For instance, the complexity on FVC2004 DB3 is 2 35 that are not ideally secure. Yet, we can further increase the complexity by either increasing m or reducing without compromising the performance accuracy. Hereby, a considerate justification is required to ensure the desired security level as well as performance criteria with proper parameters tuning.
C. Non-linkability
In this section, the requirement of non-linkability (unlinkability) is validated. To do this, we introduce the pseudo-genuine scores. The pseudo-genuine score refers to the matching scores between the hashed codes generated from different fingerprint templates of the same individual by using different permutation seeds or projection matrices. This protocol just resembles the genuine matching protocol that results 1000 pseudo-genuine matching scores as well. Refer to section VII(D), the pseud-imposter score is computed between two hashed codes generated from each template using different permutation seeds or projection matrices. In this context, when the pseudo-imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution are overlapped, it implies that the hashed codes generated from the same user or from the others are sufficiently indistinctive. On the contrary, if both distributions are separated far apart, this allows the adversary to differentiate the hashed code easily whether it is generated from the identical individual. The difficulty in differentiating the hashed codes contributed to the non-linkability or unlinkability property. Fig. 6 illustrates the pseudo-imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution plot where the pseudoimposter and pseudo-genuine distribution are largely overlapped. This supports that the hashed codes satisfy nonlinkability or unlinkability property.
D. Revocability
In this section, revocability (renewability) is evaluated by conducting the experiments where 100 hashed codes for each fingerprint vector are generated with 100 distinct random permutation seeds, and then the genuine hashed code is matched with the other 100 newly generated hashed codes. The entire process is repeated and produces 100 × (5×100) = 50000 pseudo-imposter scores. The genuine, imposter and pseudo-imposter distributions are shown in Fig. 7 where FVC2002 is used for URP-based IoM hashing while FVC2004 is tested for GRP-based IoM. From Fig. 7 , a large degree of overlapping occurs between the imposter and pseudo-imposter distributions. This implies the newly generated hashed codes with the given 100 random permutation sets and/or random projection matrices are distinctive even though it is generated from the identical source of fingerprint vector. In terms of verification performance, we obtain EER = 0.23%, 0.98%, 1.77% for URP-based IoM hashing in FVC2002 (DB1, DB2, DB3) and 1.38%, 2.32%, 2.56% for GRP-based IoM hashing in FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, DB3) respectively in which intersection of genuine and pseudo-imposter distribution is taken. This verifies that the proposed both IoM realizations satisfies the revocability property requirement. We further note that the experiment presented in section VI(B) tells that stolen tokens (e.g. permutation seed or random matrices) would not compromise the accuracy performance significantly. Thus, tokens in IoM hashing merely serves for the revocability and are not secret for public.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
In this paper, we present a simple yet generic LSH motivated cancellable biometric framework dubbed IoM hashing. We demonstrate two realizations of IoM hashing for fingerprint biometrics, namely URP-based and GRP-based IoM hashing. From both theoretical justification and empirical observations, the IoM hashed codes can largely preserve accuracy performance with respect to its before-transformed counterparts thanks to the nice property of localized random projection and the rank correlation for GRP hashing and URP hashing, respectively. IoM hashing is also shown satisfy both non-linkability and revocability template protection criteria. IoM hashing is strongly resilient against the existing several major security and privacy attacks subject to the properly tuned parameters. Analyses do suggest that the URP-based realization is favorable for security-oriented applications while GRP-based realization is for more accuracy demanded applications. Finally, we outline a new attack for cancellable biometrics namely birthday attack, which reveals even more dreadful than the dictionary attack (false accept attack). Our future work consists of two directions to further push the limits of IoM hashing. The first direction is to extend the work to unordered variable-sized representation such as fingerprint minutiae. The second direction is to integrate with biometric cryptosystem primitives such as Fuzzy Vault, Fuzzy Commitment etc., which would be a strong complement for cryptographic keys generation and protection purposes.
